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Abstract
A monopolist sells goods with possibly a characteristic consumers
dislike (for instance, he sells random goods to risk averse agents),
which does not affect the production costs. We investigate the ques-
tion whether using undesirable goods is profitable to the seller. We
prove that in general this may be the case, depending on the corre-
lation between agents types and aversion. This is due to screening
effects that outperform this aversion. We analyze, in a continuous
framework, both 1D and multidimensional cases.
Keywords: principal-agent problem, adverse selection, calculus of varia-
tions, nonlinear pricing, random contracts.
1 Introduction
Principal-Agent problems and the theory of multidimensional nonlinear pric-
ing (see for instance [3] for an overview of the topic) have known rapid ad-
vances at the end of the XXth century with the works of Armstrong [1] and
Rochet & Chone´ [8]. This framework considers a partially informed monop-
olist (or principal), selling multiproducts to a continuum of agents having
multidimensional types. This is the classical adverse selection case of infor-
mational asymmetries, involving multidimensional screening. The starting
point of the paper, and its motivation, is the following very natural and fun-
damental question. Suppose that a risk neutral monopolist may “randomize”
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the goods, facing risk averse agents (so that random contracts are undesir-
able from their viewpoint), then what will happen in the end? Should the
seller actually offer randomized goods (i.e. lotteries) or not? Will adverse
selection force him to produce those goods preferred by the consumers, or
will it be convenient to use this extra possibility in order to make profit?
Although these questions are not novel, only few answers can be found
in the literature. A simple case where risk aversion is introduced in a scalar
problem involving two agents can be found in [10] or [3]. In such cases, it
is shown that the monopolist benefits by randomizing contracts as soon as
the difference between both agent’s aversion is large enough. Another work
on n risk averse agents facing a not informed monopolist has been developed
by Maskin & Riley in [11], where they focus on auctions on a single and
indivisible good. We could also mention the work of Arnott & Stiglitz (see
[2]) for a comparison between random and deterministic insurance contracts
that a monopolist offers - again - to a finite number of buyers with unknown
preferences. More recently, and in a more general framework, Carlier proved
in [5] an existence result of optimal stochastic contracts in a relaxed ver-
sion of what we call the Rochet-Chone´ problem (i.e. the multidimensional
screening problem). However, the author does not discuss the profitability
of introducing lotteries.
It seems, according to this literature, that this question has been analyzed
so far only in discrete models (a finite number of different agents), and often
with zero production costs. The novelty of our paper is that we find the same
kind of answers in a continuous framework a` la Rochet & Chone´, thanks to
a calculus of variations formulation.
Before entering the mathematical details of the principal’s optimization
problem, we discuss some assumptions in a rather qualitative way. The agents
will be supposed to be described by a type θ and the goods the monopolist
may produce by a quality x. Both θ and x belong to a same Euclidean space
R
d (or Rd+) and the utility that an agent of type θ derives from consuming
a good x is supposed to be the scalar product θ · x. Each coordinate θi can
be viewed as a marginal utility to the ith quality of the good. Besides the
utility function, the other element of the model is the production cost C(x).
This cost is supposed to be convex in x. We consider, as in [8], the purely
quadratic production cost, i.e. C(x) = 1
2
|x|2. Both these choices (linear
utility and quadratic production costs) are the most classical and the most
significant ones, since they already capture all the qualitative features of the
solution of more general cases.
We then consider the fact that goods qualities may include a random
part, and we will describe it by introducing a new variable y ∈ R+ standing
for instance for their variance (or for the standard deviation). More precisely,
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we think of a good as a random variable X where x = E[X ] stands for the
mean and y = E[|X − x|2] = E[X2] − |E[X ]|2 is a scalar variance. We
suppose that consumer agents have still a linear utility function of the form
θ ·x+αy, where α < 0 is a new parameter in the description of agents’ type,
standing for their risk aversion (see Section 2 for a more detailed discussion).
Notice that we are assuming that the utility is linearly decreasing in y, which
means that y must be chosen as a parametrization of the randomness of the
good such that agents are linearly averse with respect to it. If by chance
in modeling a situation we find that agents are linear with respect to the
standard deviation instead of the variance, we should call y the standard
deviation. But this is, up to now, just a matter of naming variables.
The role played by y would be more important if looking at the production
cost. Due to the random components in this extended model, we will call it
CR(x, y). We have in mind at least two toy models for the dependence of CR
on y.
• There are some cases where CR depends increasingly on y, say CR(x, y) =
|x|2 + λy for λ > 0, or |x|2 + λy2. This is for instance the case where
the monopolist sells black boxes containing an unknown collection of goods,
randomly sorted according to a certain distribution (think of closed boxes
containing a dozen of wine bottles, randomly selected by the seller). If the
cost for each of them is quadratic, the cost for producing one of such boxes
is proportional to E[X2] and not to |E[X ]|2. This means that the cost is of
the form |E[X ]|2 + (E[X2]− |E[X ]|2) = |x|2 + y.
• There are also cases where CR depends decreasingly on y, say CR(x, y) =
|x|2+λy for λ < 0. This happens when the producer needs special machines
for guaranteeing more precise goods qualities, and he does not really chooses
to introduce variances, even if he can pay for reducing it. For the model
to make sense, the monopolist must be able to manage at the same time,
and at his will, the production of possibly different levels of variance, exactly
as he needs to be able to produce different levels of quality. This is surely
reasonable in large-scale firms, using different machines in different factories.
In this paper we will mainly focus on the case λ = 0, i.e. CR(x, y) = |x|
2.
This case can be obtained as a combination of the two previous effects, but
more important reasons suggest to consider it as key case.
First of all, we already pointed out that we use a parametrization of the
variable y so as to guarantee that the utility functions of agents are lin-
ear. If CR really depends on y, when specifying a dependence (for instance
CR(x, y) = |x|
2 + λy) we would be fixing a very specific case where both
production costs and utilities are linear in the same parametrization, while
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there is no modeling reason to suppose that.
Second, the case λ > 0 is not a new problem : it is just the Rochet-Chone´
Problem (see [8]) with an extra dimension. The only point which was not
investigated in [8] is the fact that we look at consumers in Rd+×R− and goods
in Rd+ × R+, i.e. we explicitly account for a characteristic that is negatively
perceived by agents, but the formalism would be the same.
Third, we will see that the main results of the paper consist in examples and
conditions where the optimal strategy for the risk neutral principal is exactly
to offer goods with nonzero values of y (i.e. lotteries). This makes the case
λ < 0 less interesting. Indeed, it is clear that whenever there exist exam-
ples where the seller offers costless lotteries, the profit he gets from lotteries
increases if λ < 0.
Moreover, it is clear from the choice λ = 0 that the label “variance” does
not play any special role any more, in the sense that this last characteristic
may be thought of as any extra feature of the good that consumers dislike.
It is easy to re-think at the whole problem in these terms : if the monopolist
may produce goods with qualities (x, y), and the value of y does not affect
the production cost, but negatively affects the utilities of the consumers, will
he use this “undesirable” quality y?
It is widely accepted that examples of this kind have been used in real life
by some companies. It was for instance the case of third-class seats in some
trains, which were just more unconfortable than second-class ones without
saving space for the railway company. It seems a common strategy of the
firms to create low-quality goods just to attract consumers that would oth-
erwise not enter the market. For these reasons, we will from now on refer to
the quality y as the undesirable quality and to α as the aversion parameter
(and not specifically risk aversion). And, for the sake of generality, we will
drop the random terminology (risk, lotteries, . . . ).
Actually, thanks to these last considerations, the problem we study and the
(partial) answers we give may switch very easily from the random interpre-
tation to the more abstract and general one of an undefined “undesirable”
quality. This is one of the main features of this very simplified model, which
does not want to compete with more sophisticated ones that have been in-
vestigated concerning Principal-Agent problems involving random contracts.
It is the case of the problems studied by Carlier in [5] (where the author
focuses on existence issues for more general utility functions and “random-
ness”, i.e. not only considering mean and variance of stochastic contracts),
as well as the work of Carlier, Ekeland & Touzi ([6]), in which, nevertheless,
the principal cannot control the level of the undesirable quality y.
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In section 2 we will first discuss more precisely the maximization prob-
lem for the principal, which we have not yet introduced. We will then jump
to the extended problem (i.e. adding the components y and α) and present
some considerations on it. Section 3 and 4 will be devoted to the description
of some classes of examples where the solution of the extended problem really
uses y (hence it does not coincide with the solution of the classical problem),
in the scalar and the multidimensional cases, respectively. The paper will be
closed by a conclusive section with comments on the result we got.
2 Classical and extended problems
We start by recalling the classical problem studied by Rochet and Chone´,
including its powerful calculus of variations formulation.
General setting Let us see more in details the very famous problem studied
by Mussa & Rosen (see [12]) in the one dimensional case and by Armstrong
and Rochet & Chone´ for the case of multidimensional types (see respectively
[1, 8]). It is a nonlinear pricing model in a monopolistic situation with adverse
selection. The principal (also the monopolist, the firm, the seller...) knows
the global distribution f of agents types on a convex open bounded domain
Ω ⊂ Rd+. This domain will be supposed for simplicity to be a rectangle and
the distribution of agents over it will be described through its density, i.e.
a positive function on Ω with integral equal to 1, that we still denote by
f . In this way we consider a continuum of buyers. Any agent with type
θ ∈ Ω derives the utility uθ(x, t) := θ · x − t from consuming a good of
quality x ∈ Q ⊂ Rd+ at price t. The monopolist has a strictly convex cost
C : x ∈ Q→ C(x) for producing a good of quality x.
The optimization of the monopolist’s strategy is performed on possible
pricing of the goods he sells : the monopolist may choose tariffs t : Q→ R+,
taking into account that any agent θ buys a good x(θ) selected so as to
maximize θ · x − t(x); she also has the possibility of not buying anything if
for every good x she gets θ · x − t(x) < 0; globally each agent buys either
zero or one good (or, equivalently, she buys exactly one good but there also
exists a zero good 0 ∈ Q whose production cost is 0, which gives utility 0 to
everybody, and such that the principal may not charge for it, i.e. t(0) = 0 is
prescribed). In this way the profit for the firm is∫
Ω
(
t(x(θ))− C(x(θ))
)
f(θ)dθ.
Thus, the principal’s optimization problem has another optimization problem
embedded: the agent’s optimization problem.
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A more standard viewpoint in incentive theory, which by the way avoids the
problem of possible multiple goods x maximizing the utility (net of price)
of the agent, is the following : agents buy either one or zero good and, in
the other hand, the firm directly chooses a family of contracts (x(θ), t(θ))θ∈Ω
(i.e. produces x(θ) and sells it at price t(θ) to the agent of type θ), and has
to take into account some incentive and participative constraints.
The first one is known as the Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraint
and basically ensures that agent of type θ will really choose x(θ) at price
t(θ) when she looks at the product line (x(θ′), t(θ′))θ′∈Ω. The second one is
the Individual Rationality constraint (IR), modeling the fact that agents do
not buy if they get a utility lower than what they would get if they bought
nothing, i.e. they have a reservation utility equal to zero. We define the two
constraints as:
(IC) θ ∈ argmax{θ · x(θ′)− t(θ′), θ′ ∈ Ω}
(IR) θ · x(θ)− t(θ) ≥ 0.
The classical problem then reads as
sup
{∫
Ω
(
t(θ)− C(x(θ))
)
f(θ)dθ, (x, t) satisfies (IC) and (IR)
}
.
Notice that it is well-known that this problem admits a unique solution.
Calculus of variations A very powerful tool to study the above problem is
the following idea : introduce (as in [1, 8]) the potential (or surplus function)
v(θ) := max{θ · x(θ′)− t(θ′), θ′ ∈ Ω}
and define
KD = {v : Ω→ R+, v is convex, and ∇v ∈ Rd+}.
Then the problem may be re-stated in terms of v, in the following way :
(PD) sup
v∈KD
JD(v) =
∫
Ω
(
θ.∇v(θ)− v(θ)− C(∇v(θ))
)
f(θ)dθ.
It is a calculus of variations formulation subject to convexity constraints.
This problem, after being introduced in [8], has been studied by Carlier and
Lachand-Robert in [7] as far as regularity results are concerned. Surprisingly,
we will really need their C1 regularity theorem. Notice that this formulation
is very useful to compute the solution, either explictely (see section 3) or
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numerically ([8, 9]). From now on we refer to the solution of (PD) as the
classical solution, in opposition to the solution of the extended problem that
we introduce in details in the next paragraph.
The extended problem We now add a component to good qualities and
to agent types. They are denoted by y and α, respectively, and we impose
y ≥ 0 and α ≤ 0. In particular, α is non-positive (we will impose that it
belongs to a bounded interval of R−, α ∈ A := [−κ, 0]) and it models agent’s
aversion to the new (one-dimensional) characteristic of the good quality.
In the sequel, we refer to the component α as the aversion parameter and to
the corresponding one-dimensional characteristic of the good as the undesir-
able quality or, more simply, we call it y. In the present work we look at Von
Neumann Morgensten (VNM) agents and the case where the y component
of the good quality does not lead to any production cost.
In other words, we consider utilities of the type uθ,α(x, y, t) = θ · x+ αy − t,
i.e. the utility that any agent of type (θ, α) ∈ Ω × A derives from buying
(x, y) ∈ Rd+1+ at price t.
As before, the distribution h of agent types on Ω × A is given (mathemat-
ically, it is an absolutely continuous measure on Ω × A, but we will as well
denote by h its density). When integrating according to this density we will
equivalently write h(θ, α)dθdα or dh(θ, α). We will always tacitly assume
that the θ−marginal of h will be the same density f that we consider in the
classical problem (i.e.
∫
A
h(θ, α)dα = f(θ) for every θ ∈ Ω).
As we mentioned before, we consider the case where the production cost
(denoted in this case by CR) does not depend on y, and we take CR(x, y) =
C(x). Introducing w(θ, α) := max{θ · x(θ′) + αy(α′)− t(θ′), (θ, α′) ∈ Ω×A
and the set
KR = {w : Ω×A→ R+, w is convex, and ∇w ∈ R
d+1
+ },
we can directly jump to the variational formulation of the problem, which is
(PR) sup
v∈KR
JR(w) =
∫
Ω×A
(
(θ, α).∇w(θ, α)−w(θ, α)−C(∂θw(θ, α))
)
dh(θ, α).
Notice that, due to the fact that the C−part of the cost (the strictly convex
one, which is given by the production cost) does not depend on ∂αw, this
problem does not coincide with a multidimensional version of Mussa-Rosen’s
problem (i.e. with a Rochet-Chone´ problem; see Section 4). We will not
enter in this paper the problem of existence of a maximizer for (PR), which
is a little bit trickier than that for (PD) or for Rochet-Chone´, due to the lack
of bounds on ∂αw. Anyway, a maximizer does exist, see for instance [4].
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The following - straightforward - proposition states that (PR) is really an
extension of (PD).
Proposition 2.1. If the solution w of (PR) is such that ∂αw = 0, then it
coincides with the solution of (PD) and sup (PR) = sup (PD). In the other
hand, if h is a measure concentrated on {α = 0}, then (PR) = (PD).
In the sequel we analyse some easy features of the maximization problem
(PR), focusing on the question whether the principal really uses positive
values of the new quality y. The two following results show that adverse
selection will “control” the use of y, even if not preventing it completely. We
will interprete later these results in terms of discrimination (or screening)
and correlation.
Proposition 2.2. If w is a solution of (PR) such that ∂αw ≥ c, for some
nonnegative constant c, then c = 0.
Proof. Let w ∈ KR be a solution of (PR) such that ∂αw ≥ c. We are only
concerned with perturbations of the type
wε(θ, α) = w(θ, α)− ε(α+ κ),
for 0 ≤ ε ≤ c. Since ∂θwε = ∂θw and ∂αwε = ∂αw − ε, it is clear that
wε is convex and increasing. The constant κ has been inserted in order to
guarantee the other admissibility constraint wε ≥ 0. To see that it is satisfied
it is sufficient to check it in the corner of Ω × A where all the coordinates
are minimal. In this point we have both w = 0 and c(α + κ) = 0, so that
wε ∈ KR. Then, we easily get
JR(wε)− JR(w) = εκ ≥ 0, ∀ε ∈ [0, c].
This contradicts the optimality of w except when c = 0 (so that ε = 0).
An interesting consequence of proposition 2.2 is that the monopolist does
not offer products involving nonzero y when he cannot use them to discrim-
inate (which is the case if the value of y is the same for every good he sells),
i.e. to screen the agents. If one restricted the offer of the monopolist adding
the constraint y = constant, then the solution would be the classical one.
Moreover, the same proposition proves that the minimal value of y among
the goods that are really present in the market must be 0. The principal will
not increase the value of y for every good just for the sake of consumers’
unhappiness, it will not be profitable to him!
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There is another general case where we can prove the principal does not
offer goods with undesirable qualities. Indeed, the following proposition says
that he does not use the undesirable quality as soon as the distribution of
types θ and the one of aversions α are independent.
Proposition 2.3. If h(θ, α) = f(θ)g(α), then the classical solution is the
unique minimizer of (PR).
Proof. Assume that w is a solution of (PR). Define v(θ)=
∫
Ω×A w(θ, α)g(α)dα.
Since v does not depend on α, we get JR(v) = JD(v). On the other hand,
using
(v′(θ))2 ≤
∫ (
∂θw(θ, α)
)2
g(α)dα (Jensen’s inequality),
−α∂αw ≥ 0 (since α ≤ 0 and ∂αw ≥ 0),∫
θv′(θ)f(θ)g(α)dθdα =
∫
θ ∂θw(θ, α)f(θ)g(α)dθdα (by linearity),
one has:
JR(v) =
∫
Ω×A
(
−
1
2
(v′(θ))2 + θv′(θ)− v(θ)
)
f(θ)g(α)dθdα
≥
∫
Ω×A
(
−
1
2
(∂θw(θ, α))
2+(θ, α)·∇w(θ, α)−w(θ, α)
)
dh(θ, α)=JR(w).
Hence, the maximization may be restricted to those convex functions that
only depend on θ, and, among them, the maximizer is v. Also remark that
the inequality −α∂αw ≥ 0 is strict for functions truly depending on α which
proves that v is the unique solution of (PR).
In the next sections, our study consists in describing situations where of
the extended problem is not the classical one. We look successively at the
scalar and the multidimensional cases.
3 When the principal should use the unde-
sirable quality : the 1D case
In this part we provide an example where the seller offers goods with various
undesirable qualities y, hence using it for screening purpose. In particular,
he uses nonzero values of y.
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Since Problem (PR) is pretty much involved in the general setting, and we
are convinced that it is not easy to classify general cases where the solution of
the extended problem is or is not the classical one, we first build an example
in the simple case d = 1. Notice that this means that the original problem
(i.e. without y and α) is one-dimensional, and it actually becomes two-
dimensional after adding these new variables.
The simplest example we can provide is the case of a quadratic production
cost and a uniform distribution of type θ on segment Ω = [θmin, θmax]. The
next proposition is well-known and describes the explicit classical solution in
a class of cases, which includes this one. We denote by F the primitive of f ,
i.e. F (θ) =
∫ θ
θmin
f(s)ds.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that f is a positive regular density on [θmin, θmax],
with
∫ θmax
θmin
f(θ)dθ = 1, that the production cost is quadratic, i.e. C(x) = 1
2
x2.
Then, the solution v of problem (PD) is characterized by
v(θmin) = 0, v
′(θ) = θ −
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
,
provided the inequalities θminf(θmin) ≥ 1 and f
′(θ)(1 − F (θ)) ≥ −2f(θ)2
hold on [θmin, θmax]. In particular, for the uniform density on [1, 2], these
assumptions are satisfied and v(θ) = 1
2
θ2 − 2θ + 3
2
.
Although the computation of v is standard, we provide it for the sake of
completeness.
Proof. The key point for solving (PD) is the integration by parts
∫ θmax
θmin
vf =
∫ θmax
θmin
v′(1− F ),
where we used F (θmax) = 1 and v(θmin) = 0 (we may assume inf v = 0 and,
v being increasing, the minimum si realized at θmin). We set u = v
′ and we
have:
JD(v) = J˜(u) =
∫ θmax
θmin
(1
2
u(θ)2 − θu(θ)
)
f(θ) + u(θ)
(
1− F (θ)
)
dθ.
Then we easily get that the minimal value would be realized by choosing:
u(θ) = θ −
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
, θ a.e.,
provided this choice is possible. This means that u(θ) must be the derivative
of a function v satisfying the constraints. Since v must be increasing and
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convex, then u must be positive and increasing. It is sufficient to compute
its derivative, to require that it is positive on [θmin, θmax], and to impose
u(θmin) ≥ 0. This last condition gives θmin −
1
f(θmin)
≥ 0, and the condition
on u′ gives
0 ≤ u′(θ) = 1−
−f(θ)2 + (1− F (θ))f ′(θ)
f(θ)2
= 2 +
(1− F (θ))f ′(θ)
f(θ)2
,
which is known as the hazard condition. The assumptions on F exactly
ensure that these conditions are satisfied. For the particular case of the
uniform density on [1, 2], just replace F (θ) = θ− 1 and f(θ) = 1 and deduce
from this equation that v′(θ) = 2(θ− 1). We then obtain the expression of v
above and finally check that v ∈ KD.
Note that it is a simple case without bunch (or equivalently perfect screening
i.e. the monopolist offers different contracts to different types).
Let us now look at the extended problem (PR) for the quadratic produc-
tion cost. Our goal is to find some cases where the solution of (PR) is not
the classical solution v of (PD).
The strategy starts by introducing, for all ε > 0, the perturbations
wε(θ, α) = v(θ + εl(α)), ∀(θ, α) ∈ Ω× A,
where l(α) = (α+a)+ = max(α+a, 0) and a ∈ (−κ, 0) is given. If necessary,
one can extend v outside Ω by affine extensions before defining wε. Notice
that w0 = v and that, due to the convexity and monotonicity properties of
l, wε is convex and increasing as well.
Proposition 3.2. Let v be the classical solution of (PD) for a certain density
of types f . Assume that v is C2 and that there exists B ⊂ Ω such that∫
B
f(θ)dθ > 0 and ∀θ ∈ B, v′′(θ) (θ − v′(θ))− v′(θ) > 0. Then there exists a
joint distribution h on Ω×A, with θ−marginal equal to f , such that JR(wε) >
JR(v) for small ε > 0. In particular sup (PR) < sup (PD) and the solution
of (PR) is not w(θ, α) = v(θ).
An explicit example is obtained if one takes Ω = [1, 2], κ = 1, a ∈ (0, 1), f =
1 and h(θ, α) = 1
a
1(θ,α)∈R1+
1
1−a1(θ,α)∈R2 , where R1 and R2 are the two regions
of Fig. 1.
Since JR(v) = JD(v) = sup (PD) and using proposition 2.1 we immediately
deduce the next corollary.
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Figure 1: Structure of the 1D example
Corollary 3.3. For some joint distributions of types and aversions, the prin-
cipal offers goods with nonzero undesirable quality y.
The previous result states that the principal takes advantage of the cost-
less and undesirable quality to discriminate. Indeed, screening considerations
and the possibility to ease the incentive constraints outperform the desire to
provide every agent with fully desirable goods (y = 0).
Before proving proposition 3.2, we would like to comment a bit such par-
ticular case. The coupling between the classical type θ and the aversion
characteristic α is concentrated on the two regions R1 (low types have low
aversion parameters) and R2 (high types have higher aversion parameters)
represented in Fig. 1. From the proof we will infer that in the present ex-
ample the principal derives profit from offering undesirable goods to those
agents having both low types θ and low aversion α (i.e. in R1). Hence, in the
present case, a correlation aspect appears: the example we provide has the
same structure than the one obtained in [10] and [3] in a discrete framework,
where optimal contracts are random when the correlation between −α and
θ is positive.
We now prove proposition 3.2.
Proof. First we compute the derivatives of wε : ∂θwε = v
′ and ∂αwε = εl′v′,
where l is differentiable (i.e. almost everywhere). We already noticed the
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admissibility of wε, which follows from the convexity and monotonicity of l
and v. Now, define j(ε) := JR(wε) and compute the first variation
j′(0)=
∫
Ω×A
[(
v′′(θ) (θ − v′(θ))− v′(θ)
)
l(α) + αv′(θ)l′(α)
]
dh(θ, α). (3.1)
Assume that there exists a set B satisfying the same assumptions as in the
proposition. Then we can choose a density h of the following form : h =
1
a˜
f(θ)1[−a˜,0] + 1κ−af(θ)1[−κ,−a](α), for some small value a˜ ∈ (0, a]. In this
case it is clear that the integral in (3.1) will be immediately restricted to
the set B × (−a˜, 0], where the first term is positive. Since the goal is to
get j′(0) > 0, we only need to choose a˜ small enough. In this case, the
term involving αv′(θ)l′(α) will be negligible (since the density h tends to
concentrate around the set {α = 0}), and
lim
a˜→0
∫ (
v′′(θ) (θ − v′(θ))− v′(θ)
)
l(α)dh= l(0)
∫
(v′′(θ) (θ − v′(θ)) f(θ)dθ>0.
Thus, we finally get j′(0) > 0.
To prove the second statement of the proposition, we simply compute the
variation replacing v (who is of course C2 in the uniform case) and h by their
expression
j′(0) =
∫
Ω×A
(
(3− 2θ)l(α) + α(θ − 1)l′(α)
)
dh(θ, α) =
a2
16
> 0.
Notice that in this particular case, B = [1, 3
2
] and a˜ = a.
Remark 3.4. We emphasize that, in the case where the production cost in
the extended problem has the form CR(x, y) = C(x) + λy for some λ >
0 one can anyway build an explicit example from the uniform density f .
More precisely, for all λ > 0, there exists M = Mλ > 0 and a density
h on [1, 2] × [−M, 0] providing a non-classical solution. This density may
be chosen of the usual form, taking 0 < a < M , with λ < 1
2
a, h(θ, α) =
1
a
1(θ,α)∈B×[−a,0]+ 1M−a1(θ,α)∈Ω\B×[−M,−a]. Notice anyway that for a fixed set of
aversion parameter A this is possible for some λ only.
Remark 3.5. Note that the assumption that v should be C2 is not really
needed to get such a result. Indeed we could suppose that v is only C1 and
apply a similar technique as the one we use for proving proposition 4.1 in the
next section.
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4 The multidimensional case
In this section we look at the multidimensional case, which has been mainly
studied in [1, 8]. Since less information on the solution in this case is known
than in the 1D one, we will try to use the minimal regularity and the minimal
structure results on the optimal v that have been investigated.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that f is a density on a convex domain Ω ⊂ Rd
such that the optimal function v in the Rochet-Chone´ problem (PD) is a
C1 convex function, with Ω0 := {v = 0} having non-empty interior. Then
there exists a density h on Ω × A such that the solution of (PR) is not
w(θ, α) = v(θ).
For the sake of this proposition, we need two things: C1 regularity of v and
the fact that there exists a flat zone {v = 0}.
General C1 regularity results are proven in [7] for the solutions of a wide
class of variational problems under convexity constraints, including the one
of Rochet & Chone´. As far as the structure of v is concerned, [8] proves
that if d = 2, v has the shape described in Fig.2 when f is an exponential
density, and check numerically the same behavior for the uniform density.
For numerical computations showing this kind of behavior, we also refer to
[9]. Anyway the crucial feature of the classical solution we need is that the
region Ω0 := {v = 0} has non-empty interior. This statement means that the
seller excludes a set of consumers. Actually, it has been proven by Armstrong
in [1] that for any dimension d ≥ 2, the set Ω0 has positive measure as soon
as Ω is strictly convex; yet, the same proof easily generalizes to other classes
domains, for instance to any straight rectangle (i.e. a rectangle whose edges
are parallel to the coordinate axes). We thus easily derive the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.2. For every regular density f of types on a domain Ω which is
either strictly convex or a straight rectangle in Rd, for d ≥ 2, there exists a
density h on Ω×A such that the optimal contract contains undesirable goods.
We will concentrate the proof of proposition 4.1 in the case of a straight
rectangle in 2D, which is the one that has been most investigated so far,
but the reader may easily notice that the procedure may be extended to
higher dimensions and to different shapes of Ω, since we only perform local
variations.
Proof. The strategy for looking at the multidimensional case is similar to
the 1D one. We suppose that the solution is a function v depending on θ
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θ1
θ2
Ω0
v = 0
ΩB
v=v(θ1+θ2)
Ω1
v strictly convex
Figure 2: The shape of the classical solution for the exponential distribution
only, and we produce a function wε through wε(θ, α) = v(θ + εel(α)), where
l is the usual function l(α) = (α + a)+ and e is a given unit vector with
positive components. In the following we choose e = ( 1√
2
, 1√
2
). The function
wε is convex and increasing with respect to each variable, provided that v is
convex and increasing. We notice that
∇θwε(θ, α) = ∇v(θ+εel(α)), ∂αwε = ε∇v(θ+εel(α))·el
′(α), for a.e. (θ, α).
Hence we can write JR(wε) and we have
JR(wε)=
∫ (
θ·∇v(zθ,α) + εαl
′(α)∇v(zθ,α)·e− v(zθ,α)−
|∇v|2
2
(zθ,α)
)
dh(θ, α)
=
∫
(−k(zθ,α)− ε(l(α)− αl
′(α))∇v(zθ,α) · e) dh(θ, α)
where zθ,α denotes θ + εel(α) and k(z) :=
1
2
|∇v(z)|2 − z · ∇v(z) + v(z).
Simplifying assumptions on h
Since our goal is just to provide sufficient conditions to show an example
where v is not optimal (and wε gives a better result than v), we can make
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some simplifying assumptions: we suppose that h(θ, α) = IK(θ)IS(α) for
those pairs (θ, α) such that l(α) 6= 0, where K ⊂ Ω is a non-negligible given
subset of Ω and S ⊂ [−a/2, 0] is an interval where l is positive. This is not
so restrictive in terms of the density f , provided f is bounded from below by
a positive constant on K: it is actually always possible to express f as the
θ−marginal of a density h of this kind, if we adjust the rest of the density
with the behavior of h on {l = 0}. This reduces the integral above to
−
∫
S
dα
∫
K
(k(zθ,α) + ε(l(α)− αl
′(α))∇v(zθ,α) · e) dθ.
Simplifying assumptions on K
Now suppose that K is actually a rectangle with two sides which are parallel
to e and two orthogonal sides denoted by ∂K+ and ∂K− (see Fig. 3). If
we denote by d1 the one-dimensional integration on ∂K+ and ∂K−, it is not
difficult to check that
d
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
∫
K
k(θ + εel(α))dθ =
d
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
∫
K+εel(α)
k(θ)dθ
= l(α)
(∫
∂K+
k(θ) d1θ −
∫
∂K−
k(θ) d1θ
)
provided that k is continuous (which is the case if v ∈ C1). Moreover, we
have ∫
K
∇v · e dθ =
∫
∂K+
v d1θ −
∫
∂K−
v d1θ.
Now, suppose that v = ∇v = 0 on ∂K−. This simplifies the computation
and yields to
d
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
JR(wε)=
∫
S
l(α)dα
(∫
∂K+
k d1θ
)
+
∫
S
(l(α)− αl′(α)) dα
(∫
∂K+
v d1θ
)
.
Since v is nonnegative and l(α) − αl′(α) = (α + a)+ − α = a ≤ 2l(α) on S,
we can estimate the last term through
∫
S
(l(α)− αl′(α)) dα
(∫
∂K+
v d1θ
)
≤ 2
∫
S
l(α)dα
(∫
∂K+
v d1θ
)
,
and get
d
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
JR(wε) ≥ −
∫
S
l(α)dα
(∫
∂K+
(k + 2v) d1θ
)
.
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eθ1
θ2
Ω0 = {v = 0}
{v > 0}
θ
θˆ WV
K
Figure 3: Structure of the 2D example
Choice of a point θ
It is now sufficient to prove that one can chooseK so that k+2v = 1
2
|∇v(θ)|2−
θ · ∇v(θ) + 3v(θ) is negative on ∂K+ in order to have a positive derivative of
JR(wε).
Here the key point is to suppose that v has a flat part Ω0 with non-empty
interior. Thanks to the convexity of v, this set is convex and we suppose that
it includes a neighborhood of 0. Let θ be a point on the boundary of Ω0 which
is in the interior of Ω. Then, thanks to the monotonicity properties of v, the
vector e is an outwards vector for the set Ω0, in the sense that v(θ+ se) > 0
for s > 0. The vector 1
2
∇v(θ) − θ will have negative coordinates, and the
same is true in a neighborhood V ⊂ Ω of θ. If −c is a constant bounding
from above the components of 1
2
∇v(θ)− θ for θ ∈ V , we can write
(
1
2
∇v(θ)− θ
)
· ∇v(θ) ≤ −ce · ∇v(θ),
and the term e · ∇v(θ) is the derivative of v in the direction e.
Choice of ∂K+ so that k + 2v < 0
Now, let us consider the values of k + 2v on a line segment stemming from
θ in the direction e, i.e. we consider (k + 2v)(θ + se) for s > 0 such that
θ + se ∈ V . Let us suppose that this quantity stays always positive : this
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means that we have the inequality
−c
d
dt
(
v(θ+se) + 2v(θ+se)
)
≥
(
1
2
∇v(θ + se)− (θ+se)
)
·∇v(θ+se)+2v(θ+se)
≥ 0 ,
which implies that
d
dt
v(θ + se) ≤
2
c
v(θ + se).
By Gronwall Lemma, this inequality implies that v(θ + se) ≤ e
2
c
sv(θ) = 0,
which is in contradiction with the fact that θ is on the boundary of Ω0, i.e.
that v(θ + se) > 0.
This implies that there exists a point θˆ of the form θ+ se in the neigbor-
hood V where k + 2v is negative. The same will be true for all the points
in a neighborhood W of θˆ. In this way, if one chooses a rectangle K such
that one of the two sides orthogonal to e is completely included in Ω0 and
the other is included in W , the derivative of JR(wε) is positive.
Notice that in this proof, we use again profitable (from the seller view-
point) contracts where goods with positive y are sold to rather low type
agents (i.e. the lowest type agents among those who enter the market). Ac-
tually, as one can see from Fig. 3, the agents who are concerned are those
who are close to the region Ω0, i.e. to the consumers who stay out of the
market.
5 Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we have been concerned with providing partial progress on
the possible profitability of random (or undesirable) contracts, for a monop-
olist facing risk averse (or averse) buyers with multidimensional types. In
comparison with the existing literature which is focused on the random in-
terpretation, we stressed the fact that, in this simplified model, randomness
is just an instance of undesirable qualities. This is why we feel free to switch
from one terminology to the other.
We first defined an extended version of the multidimensional screening
problem mainly studied by Rochet & Chone´. We discussed several interpre-
tations of the addition of an undesirable quality and we highlighted situations
where the seller either can or cannot improve his profit by offering undesirable
goods (or lotteries).
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The optimal policy is not random in the case where agents type θ and
aversion α are independent. The correlation between the distributions of
agents type and aversion seems to be at the heart of the answer. We built
profitable examples involving the undesirable quality (risk, say) when the
correlation is of the following form: low-type consumers are less risk averse.
This can be seen both in the 1D and in the multidimensional examples we
provided, where we exploited the presence of poorly risk averse agents close
to the “out-of-the-market” zone Ω0. What we get is consistent with the
results presented in [3, 10]. Yet, the novelty of this paper is to analyze these
same questions with a continuum of agents, in a Rochet & Chone´ framework.
The non profitability conclusion is also true when the monopolist is added
a constraint forcing him to offer constant risk, i.e. removing the possibility to
screen the agents (or discriminate). We saw that, if the principal really uses
random contracts (and he only does use them for pure screening purposes),
then the randomness he proposes (i.e. the undesirable characteristic y) will
take different values, including 0.
Anyway, by providing examples in both the scalar and the multidimensional
cases, we emphasized the role of the undesirable quality to screen the agents,
and we have seen that the screening considerations sometimes outperform
aversion.
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